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IV. 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the v/itnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 10 [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury 
shall remain inviolate. In courts of general 
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury 
shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of 
inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of 
four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases 
three-fourths of the jurors may find a 
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived 
unless demanded. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
v. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) provides: 
76-6-404. Theft—Elements.—A person commits 
theft if he obtains or exercies unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (1953 as amended) provides: 
41-1-112. Receiving or transferring stolen 
vehicle a felony. Any person who, with intent to 
procure or pass title to a vehicle which he knows or 
has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully 
taken, receives, or transfers possession of the same 
from or to another, or who has in his possession any 
vehicle which he knows or has reason to believe has 
been stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not an 
officer of the law engaged at the time in the 
performance of his duty as such officer, is guilty 
of a felony. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3)(1953 as amended) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the 
included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less 
than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, soliciation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a 
lesser included offense. 
VI. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. is the decision of the Court of Appeals that the 
warrantless search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment in conflict with New York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960 
(1986)? 
2. Should this court review the issue as to whether the 
warrantless search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle violated Article I, §14 
of the Utah Constitution where the Court of Appeals did not decide 
the issue? 
3. Is the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding the 
conversation between a juror and prosecution witness in conflict 
with State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1987)? 
4. Should this Court review the issue raised on appeal 
by Mr. Larocco that he was denied his sixth and fourteenth amendment 
rights to a fair trial and equal protection when two jurors saw him 
shackled and in police custody where the Court of Appeals failed to 
address such issue? 
5. is the decision of the Court of Appeals that 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle is not a lesser included offense of 
that same vehicle in conflict with Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953 
as amended) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution? 
vii. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO, 
Petitioner/Defendant, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Plaintiff. 
Case No. 860172-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 860172-CA 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Larocco, 
No. 860172-CA (filed August 27, 1987) is attached, as Appendix A to 
this petition. A copy of that Court's order denying Appellantfs 
Petition for Rehearing is attached hereto as Appendix B. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on August 27, 
1987 (Appendix A). The Court denied Mr. Larocco's Petition for 
Rehearing on October 6, 1987 (Addendum B). The Petition for 
Rehearing tolled the period in which this Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari had to be filed. Rule 45(c) of the Utah Rules of Supreme 
Court (1986). This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is therefore 
timely filed with this Court pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(5 )(1986) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of Proceedings Below. 
Appellant, Phillip Larocco, appealed from a conviction 
and judgment for one count of Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 and 
§76-6-412 (1953 as amended) and one count of Possession of a Stolen 
Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§41-1-112 (1953 as amended). A jury found him guilty after a trial 
which was held on December 9 and 10, 1985 (See opinion at 1, 
Appendix A). The Court sentenced Mr. Larocco to concurrent terms of 
one to fifteen years and zero to five years at the Utah State 
Prison. Trial proceedings occurred in Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
DAvid B. Dee, Judge, presiding. 
On direct appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the 
conviction. The majority held that: 
(1) The search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle without a 
warrant was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, and the denial of 
his motion to suppress proper; 
(2) The conversation between a juror and witness in 
the case did not constitute juror misconduct so as 
to deprive Mr. Larocco of his constitutional right 
to a fair trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Utah 
Constitution; and, 
(3) no error occurred in convicting Mr. Laracco of 
both Theft of a Motor Vehicle and Possession of 
Stolen Property involving the same motor vehicle. 
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The Court of Appeals did not address a fourth issue 
raised on appeal by Mr. Larocco that Mr. Larocco was denied his 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and equal 
protection of the law when jurors saw him shackled and in police 
custody on at least two occasions during trial. Nor did the Court 
address the issue raised by Mr. Larocco as to whether the search 
violated his rights under the Utah Constitution. 
Mr. Larocco petitioned for rehearing on all points; that 
petition was denied without comment and without addressing the 
fourth issue raised on appeal which the Court had previously 
ignored. Mr. Larocco seeks review of the decision of the Court of 
Appeals on all issues. 
B. Pertinent Facts. 
In June, 1981f a man took a 1973 Ford Mustang for a test 
drive from State Auto Sales Car Lot and never returned it (R. 186). 
The salesman assisting the man reported the theft and gave a 
description of the thief to police (R. 202). Police did not arrest 
anyone on the charge at that time. 
Four years later, in May, 1985, the salesman saw a person 
he believed to be the thief at a different car lot (R. 190). The 
salesman obtained information regarding the man he believed to be 
the thief and relayed it to the owner of State Auto Sales Car Lot 
(R. 192). The owner went to the neighborhood where the man lived 
and spotted a 1973 Ford Mustang in front of Mr. Larocco's home (R. 
215). 
Two or three days later, a Salt Lake County detective 
went to Mr. Larocco's home and saw a 1973 Mustang parked in front of 
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it (R. 231). She took down the address and the car's license number 
and description (R. 231-33). Thereafter, she ran a plate check and 
found a vehicle identification number ("VIN") (3F05H101968) . A VIN 
check revealed that a Mr. Hailes of Salt Lake City had purchased the 
car in 1973 and registered it through 1975; the next registration 
entry for the VIN was to Mr. Larocco (R. 232-233). 
About a week later, the detective, along with another 
officer and an employee of the Department of Motor Vehicles, 
returned to Mr. Larocco's home; the Mustang was still parked in the 
same place out front (R. 234). The officers and employee looked 
through the windshield and saw a VIN on the dash which was identical 
to the one obtained by the detective when she ran a license check 
(3F05H101968)(R. 235-236). The employee of the Division of Motor 
Vehicles inspected the VIN on the dash from the exterior of the 
vehicle and it appeared to be affixed in the normal manner (R. 
283). This VIN did not match that of the Mustang taken from State 
Auto Sales Car Lot four years earlier (R. 235-236). 
After seeing the matching VIN on the dash, the officers 
opened the door and entered the car without a warrant (See 
Stipulation of Facts submitted in connection with Defendant's Motion 
to Suppress on August 6, 1985, Appendix C; Opinion, Appendix A at 
2). They found a different VIN, 3F05H164088, on the safety standard 
sticker located on the inside edge of the door (R. 235). That VIN 
matched that of the Mustang stolen from State Auto Sales Car Lot 
four years earlier (R. 235). After finding the second VIN, the 
police approached Mr. Larocco's home and arrested him (See Appendix 
A at 2; R.15). 
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Prior to trial, Mr. Larocco filed a timely motion to 
suppress evidence obtained by police as a result of the warrantless 
search of Mr. Larocco's vehicle; the trial court denied that motion 
(R. 60). 
During trial, one of the jurors had a fairly lengthy 
conversation with witness Hailes, the man who had owned a 1973 
Mustang with VIN matching that found on the dashboard of Mr. 
Larocco's car (R. 164). Mr. Hailes flipped on a couple light 
switches and commented that they worked; he then said he hoped the 
trial did not last long because he was driving to Eureka, where the 
juror lived. (See Appendix A at 17.) Mr. Hailes asked the juror 
whether she had been a juror before. (See Appendix A at 17.) A 
portion of the conversation also dealt with questions asked of the 
panel on voir dire (R. 166). Mr. Hailes told the juror he was 
surprised that none of the potential jurors would give greater 
weight to the testimony of a police officer since he would believe a 
police officer over a lay witness (R. 166). Another juror standing 
nearby apparently heard the conversation but was not questioned by 
the Court (R. 167) . 
Mr. Larocco requested that the jury be instructed that 
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle is a lesser included offense of Theft 
of Motor Vehicle; the trial court denied the request and instructed 
the jury that they could convict on both changes despite defense 
counsel's objection. The jury convicted Mr. Larocco of both counts 
(R. 325) . 
After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court 
learned that two jurors had seen activity indicating that Mr. 
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Larocco was in custody. One juror saw Mr. Larocco, apparently 
handcuffed, being escorted down the stairs by a man wearing a suit 
(R. 328). Another saw Mr. Larocco being placed into a police car 
(R. 328-329). 
On January 10, 1986, Mr. Larocco made a timely motion to 
arrest judgment based on the juror's misconduct and the 
observations of other jurors which led them to believe Mr. Larocco 
was in custody (R. 104-5). The trial court denied the motion (R. 
345. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
THAT THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MR. LAROCCOfS CAR 
DID NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS IN CONFLICT 
WITH ESTABLISHED LAW. 
In the Court of Appeals, Mr. Larocco argued that the 
warrantless search conducted by officers when they opened the door 
and entered his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Larocco 
had standing to challenge the search in this case where he claimed 
to be the bonafide owner of the vehicle. See Appendix A at 2-5; See 
also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); State v. Montayne, 414 
P.2d 958 (Utah 1966); Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th 
Cir. 1965); United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977). 
While conflicting decisions exist as to whether entry 
into a vehicle to find a VIN constitutes a search, the better 
reasoned approach is that such an entry is a search. See Simpson v. 
United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965). Furthermore, in New 
York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960 (1986), the United States Supreme Court 
stated: 
- 6 -
"We note that our holding today does not authorize 
police officers to enter a vehicle to obtain a 
dashboard mounted VIN when the VIN is visible from 
outside the vehicle. If the VIN is in plain view of 
someone outside the vehicle, there is no 
justification for governmental intrusion into the 
passenger compartment to see it. 
Id. at 969. This suggests that the United States Supreme Court 
would also consider the warrantless entry in this case, where the 
VIN on the dash was visible, to be a search. 
The officers lacked probable cause to search the 
vehicle. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 410 (1969); State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 
(Utah 1984) establishing two prong standard for probable cause. In 
the present case, officers had no facts or information to justify 
the search. They saw a VIN through the front window of the car 
which appeared to be properly mounted (R. 283). The VIN did not 
match that of the stolen vehicle (R. 235-236). Officers should have 
continued the investigation or tried to obtain consent before 
searching the vehicle. Entering the vehicle on a hunch was improper 
in this case where no probable cause existed. See Ybarra v. 
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
The only exception to the search warrant requirement 
which could possibly apply in this case is the "automobile 
exception". See State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983) for list 
of exceptions. The "automobile exception" was first articulated in 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). While the law 
regarding such exception in the federal context is somewhat 
confusing and contradictory (See Appendix A at 9, 23-26), the facts 
of this case nevertheless do not fit within its framework. 
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In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the 
United States Supreme Court distinguished between searches of a 
moving vehicle which has been stopped (as in Carroll) and a 
stationary vehicle and required exigent circumstances for the 
warrantless search of a stationary vehicle, in Hudson v. Texas, 588 
S.W. 2d 348 (Tex. 1979), the Texas Supreme Court required one of the 
following exigencies for a valid warrantless search of an 
automobile: (1) the car was moving when stopped, or (2) if 
stationary, then the car is movable, the owner knew police were 
investigating and the car would have been moved if officers did not 
immediately seize it. 
The majority of the Court Appeals panel hearing this case 
believed that the decision in New York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960 
(1986) compelled the conclusion that the warrantless search did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment (See Appendix B at 5). However, as 
Justice Billings pointed out in her concurrence, New York v. class, 
supra, does not compel such a result. 
In New York v. class, supra, Justice O'Connor 
specifically limited her holding to the circumstances of that case. 
In Class, officers attempted to ascertain a car's VIN after 
observing Mr. Class commit two traffic violations and exit his 
vehicle. The VIN on the dashboard of the automobile was obscured by 
papers; the officers reached inside the vehicle to move papers so as 
to view the VIN and observed a gun. 
The Class court pointed out that federal regulation 
requires that the VIN for cars manufactured after 1969 must be 
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visible through the windshield. See New York v. Class, supra; 49 
C.F.R. §571.115. In the present case, the automobile was 
manufactured in 1973 and had a VIN visible on the dash as required 
by federal regulation (Appendix A at 1, 21). It did not appear 
abnormal to the employee of the Division of Motor Vehicles who 
accompanied officers (R. 283). Mr. Larocco was not in the vehicle 
nor was he stopped for traffic violations (Appendix A at 1). After 
seeing the VIN on the dash as required by federal regulation, the 
officers chose to continue their search by opening the door of the 
vehicle (Appendix A at 1). 
As the dissent noted, the Class court stated: 
We note that our holding today does not authorize 
police officers to enter a vehicle to obtain a 
dashboard-mounted VIN when the VIN is visible from 
outside the automobile. If the VIN is in the plain 
view of someone outside the vehicle, there is no 
justification for governmental intrusion into the 
passenger compartment to see it. 
New York v. Class, supra at 969 (emphasis added). 
In this case, where the VIN on the dash was in plain 
view, the officers had no reason to open the door for further 
inspection, and the majority of the Court of Appeals misapplied New 
York v. Class, supra, in deciding otherwise. 
POINT II. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT 
ADDRESS THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY MR. LAROCCO 
THAT THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH VIOLATED ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Although Mr. Larocco argued that the search violated his 
rights against unreasonable search and seizure under the Utah 
Constitution, the Court of Appeals refused to address that issue. 
In footnote 7 of its majority opinion, the Court of Appeals stated 
in part: 
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The Utah Supreme Court has, to date, decided 
search and seizure cases argued under a Utah 
constitutional theory consonant with decisions under 
the United States Constitution's fourth amendment, 
eschewing a different standard. See State v. Hygh, 
711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 
1334 (Utah 1984). We agree with the dissent that 
any departure from this approach should be announced 
by our state's supreme court, not this Court. We 
further agree that it is in the context of vehicular 
searches, which the federal courts have treated with 
inconsistency, or worse, where consideration of some 
departure from the course set by the federal courts 
in interpreting the federal constitution would be 
most appropriate. 
Opinion, Appendix A at 9. 
Judge Billings went further in her separate opinion, 
To date the Utah Supreme Court, in applying 
article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution to 
warrantless vehicle searches, has followed the 
interpretation previously given to the fourth 
amendment by the United States Supreme Court. See 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). I 
must, therefore, reluctantly concur in the decision 
of the majority that the search was not 
unconstitutional. However, I do not believe that 
Utah must continue to accept the United States 
Supreme Court's constantly changing interpretation 
of the federal search and seizure law in 
interpreting its own constitution. This change in 
direction, however, must come from the supreme court 
of this state. 
Opinion, Appendix A at 23. 
While the language in Article I, §14 of the Utah 
Constitution is identical to that of the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, this Court is nevertheless free to 
interpret the Utah provision so as to allow greater protection i 
the area of warrantless searches than its federal counterpart. 
Judge Billings and the majority acknowledge, the federal law 
concerning warrantless automobile searches is confusing and 
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contradictory. (See Appendix A at 9, 23-26). See also Justice 
Zimmerman's concurring opinion in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
271-272 (Utah 1985) . 
Justice Billings suggests that some of this confusion was 
dissipated by the decision in California v. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 2066 
(1985) but that "it was done so at the sacrifice of the rights of 
the citizens of this nation to be secure in their effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." (Appendix A at 26). While 
confusion in this area still exists, especially when Carney is read 
in light of the subsequent opinion in New York v. Class, supra, it 
is nevertheless apparent that the federal protection against a 
warrantless search of a vehicle has been severely eroded. The 
original purpose of warrantless automobile searches, the protection 
of police officers and prevention of immediate destruction of 
evidence, is no longer the basis for permitting such warrantless 
searches. See State v. Hygh, supra at 272 (Zimmerman, J. 
concurring); see also Appendix A at 26. Despite the federal erosion 
on the protection against unreasonable search and seizure, the State 
of Utah may neverthess continue to offer this protection to its 
citizens, AS Justice Billings concluded: 
Following many of her sister state courts, the 
Utah Supreme Court may take this opportunity to 
simplify Utah's vehicle search and seizure law 
without gutting the protection it provides to the 
citizens of this state. See State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 
803, 805 (Utah 1986). Warrantless vehicle searches 
could be restricted to only those situations where 
they serve their original purpose of protecting 
police officers and preventing the immediate 
destruction of evidence. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264, 272 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
(Appendix A at 26). 
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In the present case where Mr. Larocco was not aware of 
the investigation, the car remained parked in the same place for 
several days, there was no evidence that officers were in danger or 
evidence might be destroyed, the warrantless search of Mr. Larocco's 
vehicle violated his rights against unreasonable search and seizure 
under Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
POINT III, 
THE ISSUE 
JUROR 
IS IN 
AND 
. THE UTAE 
REGARDING 
[ COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED 
THE 
A PROSECUTION 
CONFLICT WITH 
CONVERSATION 
WITNESS IN A 
BETWEEN A 
WAY THAT 
THIS COURT'S DECISION IN 
STATE V. PIKE, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985). 
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 
I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused a fair 
trial by an impartial jury. In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 
1985), this Court found that juror contact with a witness raises a 
rebuttable presumption of prejudice. That presumption attaches 
regardless of the content of the conversation where the contact went 
beyond the barest, incidental contact. State v. Pike, supra at 
279. This Court stated in Pike: 
Due consideration for the potential and often 
unprovable tainting of a juror by contacts between 
jurors and others involved in a trial that are more 
than brief and inadvertent encounters, leads us to 
reaffirm the proposition that a rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice arises from any 
unauthorized contact during a trial between 
witnesses, attorneys or court personnel and jurors 
which goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and 
brief contact. The possibility that improper 
contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she may 
not even be able to recognize and that a defendant 
may be left with questions as to the impartiality of 
the jury, leads to the conclusion that when the 
contact is more than incidental, the burden is on 
the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized 
contact did not influence the juror. 
Id. at 279. 
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The present case presents a more egregious factual 
situation than in Pike, The contact was more than merely incidental 
or brief. Prosecution witness Hailes owned a Mustang with a VIN 
matching that found on the dashboard of Mr. Larocco's car (R. 164). 
He flipped a couple light switches and commented they worked then 
said he hoped the trial would not last long because he was driving 
to Eureka where the juror lived. (See Appendix A at 17.) He asked 
the juror whether she had been a juror before (Appendix A at 17) 
then told her that he was surprised that none of the potential 
jurors would give greater weight to the testimony of a police 
officer since he would believe a police officer over a lay witness 
(R. 166). Because of the length of the conversation and topics 
covered, this conversation was more than merely incidental and 
raised the presumption of prejudice. 
The State failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice. 
The conversation regarding the trip to Eureka bred the same 
familiarity with jurors as did the injured toe conversation in 
Pike. The conversation went beyond a general discussion and focused 
on the credibility of the actual witnesses in the trial. Finally, 
the court failed to question another juror who was standing nearby 
and apparently overheard the conversation. 
In two separate opinions, two of the three judges of the 
Court of Appeals concluded that the state rebutted the presumption. 
Justice Greenwood stated: 
The state argues that the presumption was 
successfully rebutted for three reasons: (1) the 
juror stated she was not influenced by the contact; 
(2) Mr. Hailes was not a key witness nor in such a 
respected position that he would likely be 
influential; and most importantly, (3) the testimony 
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presented at trial by police officers was 
uncontroverted, so that their credibility was not an 
issue. 
She concluded: 
The trial judge listened to the testimony and 
arguments regarding possible prejudice. We find 
that he reasonably determined that the state had 
sustained its burden of demonstrating that no 
prejudice against defendant resulted from the 
contact. 
Appendix A at 11. 
Justice Orme believed that Pike required inquiry into 
whether (1) the witness was important to the prosecution and (2) the 
scope and subject matter of the conversation. He concluded that 
Hailes was an unimportant witness and therefore the increased 
familiarity with the juror inconsequential. He also concluded that 
the subject matter of the conversation was not damaging since the 
officers were not important witnesses either. By this reasoning, no 
witness alone, where the case is composed of many witnesses offering 
bits of testimony to put the case together, even though each witness 
is critical to establishing the state's case, would be important 
enough to keep the presumption from being rebutted. Hailes was 
necessary to the state's case just as the police officers were, in 
addition, familiarity with a prosecution witness could align a juror 
with the state's position regardless of the importance of that 
witness' testimony. Finally, as Justice Billings points out, the 
credibility of witnesses including officers is always at issue 
regardless of whether the defendant puts on evidence or even 
cross-examines them (Appendix A at 18-19). 
In her dissent, Justice Billings offered a more correct 
reading of Pike. She pointed out that this court acknowledged in 
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State v. Pike/ supra at 279-80, that it has "long taken a strict 
approach in assuring that the constitutional guarantee of a fair 
trial [is not] compromised by improper contacts between jurors and 
witnesses . . . " and that "prejudice may well exist even though it 
is not provable and even though a person who has been tainted may 
not, himself, be able to recognize that fact." Appendix A at 16. 
After a lengthy discussion of Pike and the facts in this case 
(Appendix A at 16-19), she concluded: 
I find that the encounter between Mr. Hailes and 
the questioned juror created a presumption of 
prejudice. Because the contact went to the 
substance of the proceedings, and the record does 
not persuade me the presumption of prejudice was 
rebutted, I would reverse for a new trial by an 
impartial jury. 
Appendix A at 19. 
Because the two justices who concurred in the majority 
misread Pike and because the state failed to rebut the presumption 
of prejudice, Mr. Larocco respectfully requests that this Court 
review this issue. 
POINT IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO ADDRESS 
THE ISSUE RAISED BY MR. LAROCCO THAT HE WAS DENIED 
HIS SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO A FAIR 
TRIAL AND EQUAL PROTECTION WHEN TWO JURORS SAW HIM 
SHACKLED AND IN POLICE CUSTODY DURING TRIAL. 
Trying a defendant in identifiable prison garb violates 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the law. 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). See also Chess v. Smith, 
617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) . 
The California Supreme Court has held in a number of 
decisions that shackles and similar devices are manifestly 
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prejudicial when viewed by the jury. See People v. Harrington, 42 
Cal. 165 (1871); People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322 (ca. 1977). 
In the present case, during an adjournment, one juror saw 
Mr. Larocco, apparently handcuffed, being escorted down the stairs 
(R. 328). Another juror saw Mr. Larocco being placed in a police 
car during a recess (R. 328-329). Such viewings by jurors who would 
ultimately decide the case violated Mr. Larocco's Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to equal protection of the law. Mr. Larocco raised 
this issue on appeal to the Court of Appeals and the Court failed to 
address it in its opinion. Mr. Larocco raised the issue again in 
his petition for rehearing which was denied without comment 
(Appendix B). Because the Court of Appeals failed to address this 
issue even though Mr. Larocco raised it in his opening brief and in 
his petition for rehearing, Mr. Larocco respectfully requests that 
this Court review the issue. 
POINT V. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
THAT POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE IS NOT A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THEFT OF THAT SAME VEHICLE IS 
IN CONFLICT WITH STATE LAW. 
On appeal Mr. Larocco made two related assignments of 
error, arguing (1) that he could not be convicted of theft of a 
motor vehicle and possession of that same motor vehicle and 
possession of that same motor vehicle and (2) the trial court erred 
in refusing to instruct that possession of a stolen vehicle is a 
lesser included offense of theft of that vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (3) (1953 as amended) provides 
that an accused cannot be convicted of an underlying offense and an 
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included offense and defines an included offense as one "established 
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged." 
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983), this Court 
held that under the circumstances of that case, the crime of theft 
was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery. This court 
explained that under §76-1-402 (3), "conviction of a lesser included 
offense (1) is permitted as an alternate to the charged offense but 
(2) is not permitted as an addition to it." Hill, 674 P.2d at 96. 
See Shackleford v. State, 481 P.2d 163 (Okl. 1971)(holding defendant 
could not be convicted of Robbery and Possession of Narcotics taken 
in that robbery). 
Courts examining the issue of double conviction have 
almost unanimously followed the Shackelford court in holding that a 
defendant cannot be convicted of both theft (or robbery or larceny) 
and possession (or receiving or retaining) of the same stolen 
property. See e.g., Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619 (Alaska App. 
1981); Pierce v. State, 627 P.2d 211 (Alaska App. 1981); People v. 
Jackson, 627 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1981); State v. Alvarez, 678 P.2d 1132 
(Kan. App. 1984); State v. Hernandez, 689 P.2d 1261 (Mont. 1984); 
State v. Smith, 670 P.2d 963 (N.M. App. 1983); State v. Richards, 
621 P.2d 165 (Wash. App. 1980); State v. McPherson, 444 P.2d 5 (Or. 
1968) . 
In the present case, Mr. Larocco was convicted of theft 
of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony, and of 
possession of a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony. Both 
convictions related to the same vehicle, a 1973 Ford Mustang, which 
was stolen on a single occasion in 1981. 
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Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) lists the 
elements of theft, the greater offense, while U.C.A. §41-1-112 
outlines the elements of possession of a stolen vehicle. Both 
elements of possession of a stolen vehicle: 1) possessing a 
vehicle, and 2) the possessor knowing or having reason to believe 
that it was stolen, are necessarily included in the first element of 
theft, which requires that an individual obtain or exercise control 
over property of another. Conviction of both violates the Fifth 
Amendment prohibition of double jeopardy and/or the broader 
prohibition of double convictions contained in U.C.A. 
§76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended). 
The Court of Appeals held that separate charges were 
proper and no lesser included instruction necessary because "the 
events occurred four years apart and where there were intervening 
circumstances and perhaps intervening possessors of the stolen 
goods, the argument fails" Appendix A at 12-13. However, in this 
case there was no evidence of intervening possessors or any activity 
on the part of Mr. Larocco which would justify two separate 
convictions for the single criminal activity of theft of the Mustang. 
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals is in 
conflict with existing law, Mr. Larocco respectfully requests that 
this Court review this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Larocco respectfully 
requests that this Petition for Writ of Certiorari be granted and 
that this Court review each of the five issues addressed. 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Phillip Paul Larocco, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
r i Lt u 
Before Judges Greenwood, Orme and Billings. 
AUG 2 71987 
- „ „ ^ ^ , ^ ^ ^ _ , Timothy M. Shea 
GREENWOOD, J u d g e : Cler* of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Defendant seeks reversal of his jury conviction of theft 
and possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendant contends the 
trial court erred in: (1) admitting evidence obtained without a 
search warrant; (2) refusing to grant a mistrial after a 
conversation between a juror and a prosecution witness; and (3) 
instructing the jury it could convict defendant of both theft 
and possession of the same stolen vehicle. 
In June of 1981, a distinctive 1973 Ford Mustang was 
reported stolen from State Auto Sales. The theft allegedly 
occurred when a man who had twice previously visited the car 
lot was allowed by a salesman to take the car for an 
unaccompanied test drive. The man failed to return the car or 
pay for it. 
In May of 1985, the same salesman saw defendant at another 
car sales showroom. He obtained defendant's name and address 
and relayed that information to the owner of the lot from which 
the Mustang had been stolen in 1981, a Mr. Padilla. Mr. 
Padilla could not locate the exact street address, but did 
observe the Mustang parked on the street within a couple of 
blocks of the address. Mr. Padilla noted the license number 
and called the police. 
Shortly thereafter Deputy Robison, in response to Mr. 
Padilla's call, observed the Mustang parked in front of what 
proved to be defendant's home and ascertained through state 
licensing records that the Mustang.was registered in 
defendant's name. Deputy Robison also checked the Vehicle 
Identification Number (VIN) listed with the state for the 
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vehicle's registration and was informed that the VIN came from 
a 1973 Mustang registered to a Mr. Neil Hailes. 
About a week later Deputy Robison and two other officers 
returned to the neighborhood where the Mustang was parked. 
They looked through the front window at the VIN tag on the 
dashboard. That VIN matched the VIN identified as being that 
of Mr. Hailesf Mustang but did not match the VIN of the vehicle 
stolen from Mr. Padilla's car lot. The officers then opened 
the unlocked door and observed the VIN on the safety standard 
sticker on the inside edge of the door. This VIN differed from 
that on the dashboard, but matched that of the Mustang stolen 
in 1981 from State Auto Sales. The officers then went to 
defendants home, read him his Miranda rights, and arrested 
him. Defendant consistently claimed he had purchased the 
Mustang. Subsequent investigation revealed that Neil Hailes1 
Mustang was totally destroyed in a car accident in December of 
1975. 
L 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Prior to trial and at trial defendant moved to suppress the 
VIN evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of 
the Mustang. The motions were denied. Defendant asserts on 
appeal that the warrantless search violated his United States 
and Utah constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure.1 
Two elements must be examined in connection with the search 
and seizure claim of defendant. First, we must determine if 
defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the 
search. Second, if we determine that defendant does have such 
standing, we must ascertain whether or not the search was legal. 
A. 
STANDING 
The question of standing to protest an alleged unlawful 
search was discussed by the United States Supreme Court in 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Petitioners in Rakas 
were passengers in, not owners of, a car which was searched by 
1. Language in article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution is 
substantially identical to that in the fourth amendment of the 
United States Constitutions "The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place-to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized.n Utah Const, art. I, § 14. 
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police without first obtaining a warrant. The search produced 
a rifle and shells used as evidence to convict petitioners. In 
arguing that the evidence should have been suppressed, 
petitioners urged the Court to adopt the rule that a person has 
standing to prevent a warrantless search when the search is 
"directed- against that person or the person is legitimately on 
the premises at the time of the search. The Court did not 
agree, finding that fourth amendment rights are personal and do 
not extend to the search of another's premises or property. 
Id. at 133. The Court refused to expand the exclusionary rule 
to vicarious use and stated the standard as being -whether the 
person who claims protection of the Amendment has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.- l£l. at 144. The 
-legitimate expectation of privacy- test continues to be the 
usual measure utilized in federal and state search and seizure 
proceedings. 
Federal circuit courts have also examined standing to 
object to search and seizure in fact situations somewhat 
similar to the case herein. In Simpson v. United States, 346 
F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965), the police, suspecting defendant had 
stolen a vehicle, arrested him for vagrancy and investigation 
of car theft and jailed him. While defendant was in jail, the 
police conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle, which 
produced evidence of violation of the Dyer Act. Based on that 
evidence, defendant was convicted under the Dyer Act of 
interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle. In reversing 
the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the 
evidence, the court rejected the notion that defendant could 
not protest the search because the car was stolen, as such 
reasoning would mean that police could conduct searches at 
will. The result would be that 
of all defendants prosecuted for 
automobile theft, only those who actually 
owned the automobiles could raise Fourth 
Amendment objections successfully. 
Moreover, the proof of ownership would be 
sufficient to quash the prosecution for 
theft of the automobile. These 
constitutional rights belong to the guilty 
as well as the innocent. (citation 
omitted) The sole prerequisite to a 
defendant's raising the Fourth Amendment 
issue is that he claims a proprietary or 
possessory interest in the searched or 
seized property. 
Ifi. at 294. 
The Ninth Circuit also discussed standing of one accused of 
auto theft to object to search of the alleged stolen vehicle. 
The court stated that -a person accused of a Dyer Act violation 
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as the defendant was here has automatic standing to contest the 
validity of search or seizure of a vehicle or its contents 
where possession of the vehicle forms the basis of the 
charge.- United States v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263,,1269 (9th 
Cir. 1977). 
The Tenth Circuit later reached a different result in 
United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788 (10th Cir,, 1984). In 
Erickson, evidence obtained from a warrantless search of an 
airplane was deemed admissible. The court stated that "no 
testimony showed that the defendant had anything to do with 
Emery Air Freight or that he was authorized by Emery to 
possess, use, or fly the aircraft. Thus, defendant failed to 
show lawful possession of the plane giving rise to a legitimate 
expectation of privacy." Id., at 790. Erickson was 
subsequently cited in United States v. Obreoon, 748 F.2d 1371, 
1375 (10th Cir. 1984), where defendant was in sole possession 
and control of a car rented by another. The court found 
defendant had no standing to object to a search of a car which 
was rented by someone else* 
The Utah Supreme Court has also examined standing to object 
to a warrantless search and seizure. In State v. Montavne, 18 
Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958 (1966), defendant rented a car under a 
false name and failed to return it when due. Defendant was 
stopped by a police officer who knew he was a parolee. After 
determining that the car was rented under a name other than 
that of defendant and that it was overdue for return, the 
police officer arrested defendant for car theft. He then 
searched the car and found evidence which defendant sought to 
have suppressed. The Court held that because defendant's lack 
of ownership of the car was established prior to the search, 
defendant had no standing to object to the search. The fourth 
amendment can be invoked only by one who can establish that he 
was a victim of an invasion of privacy. Id. at 960. Similarly 
in State v. Purcell, 586 P«2d 441 (Utah 1978), the searched 
vehicle was known to have been stolen prior to its search. The 
Court stated that H[d]efendant simply lacks standing in court 
to attack the warrant as to the search of the stolen 
automobile, since on the facts before us, defendant had 
absolutely no possessory or proprietary interest therein that 
could have been invaded.H 1^. at 443. 
In State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984), use of 
evidence obtained from a vehicle which the defendant was 
driving was challenged under both the Utah and United States 
Constitutions. The search was upheld because defendant stated 
he did not own the car and demonstrated no expectation of 
privacy in the effects searched. Most recently, in State v. 
Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987), police officers saw 
defendant and another person in a car. Police knew that 
defendant had a suspended driverfs license and that the other 
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occupant was wanted on an arrest warrant. They arrested both 
occupants and impounded the car, which belonged to a third 
person. An inventory search revealed marijuana. The Court held 
that the evidence was admissible as defendant had no right to 
possession of the car, it was registered to another and there was 
no indication that defendant had been given permission to drive 
the vehicle. The Court stated: "Absent claimed right to 
possession, he could not assert any expectation of privacy in the 
items seized and had no standing to object to the search.- Id. 
at 127. 
These Utah cases have been decided under both the United 
States and the Utah Constitutions' search and seizure 
provisions. In each Utah case where the search was upheld it was 
clearly established and not disputed prior to the search that 
defendant did not own or did not have an interest in the property 
searched. These cases are distinguishable from those where 
defendant asserts ownership of the property, or otherwise an 
interest giving rise to a "legitimate expectation of privacy." 
We agree with the reasoning in State v. Constantino, that there 
must be at least a claimed right to possession in the property. 
In addition, consistent with the reasoning of United States v. 
Simpson, we believe that the fourth amendment and its Utah 
counterpart would be rendered farcical if police officials were 
allowed to engage in warrantless searches of property for the 
ultimate purpose of proving that property stolen. 
In this case, prior to the search, police knew that the car 
was registered in defendant's name and that it was parked in 
front of defendant's home. Only the search itself corroborated 
other information indicating that it was the stolen vehicle. 
Under these circumstances where defendant has not declared 
beforehand that he has no interest in the vehicle, and where 
proving that the car was stolen is one of the critical facts to 
be established at trial, we hold that the defendant has standing 
to challenge the legality of the search. 
B. 
LEGALITY OF SEARCH 
We now turn to the question of whether the search, as 
actually conducted, violated defendant's constitutional rights. 
The parties stipulated that two officers first looked through the 
windshield of the vehicle and noted a VIN which did not match 
that of the stolen car. They then opened the unlocked driver's 
door and noted a VIN on the safety sticker which did match that 
of the stolen car. No further search of the car's interior was 
conducted. 
The legality of the search of a VIN has been addressed in 
several cases. In Glisson v. United States, 406 F.2d 423 (5th 
Cir. 1969), defendant was in jail on another matter when police 
officers first searched a truck suspected to have been stolen 
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by defendant. The officers opened the front door of the truck 
and noted the VIN on the inside of the door. They tried to 
locate an identification number in other locations on the 
truck, but were unable to do so. The court observed that 
* [manufacturers place confidential numbers in several hidden 
locations and they correspond with the more obvious, 
identification number placed just inside the door on the 
drivers side of the vehicle." Glisson, 406 F.2d at 424. After 
discussing the issue of whether or not the defendant had 
standing to move for exclusion of evidence obtained in this 
initial search of the vehicle, the court found the search 
illegal for the following reasons: (1) the vehicle was in a 
truck park while the defendant was in jail; (2) opening the 
door of the truck was not incidental to an arrest; (3) no 
emergency existed; (4) there was no danger that evidence would 
be removed or destroyed; and (5) the identification number was 
not needed for police bookkeeping records. Ifl. at 428. 
United State v. Polk, 433 Fe2d 644 (5th Cir. 1970) also 
involved testimony from a police officer as to a VIN on a 
stolen vehicle. In Polk, the evidence was ruled admissible 
because: (1) the car door was not locked; (2) no damage 
occurred as a result of the police inspection; (3) there was no 
search of private areas of the vehicle, such as the glove 
compartment; (4) there was no seizure of the vehicle; (5) there 
was no infringement of other property rights as the car was in 
a repair garage; (6) the owner of the garage consented to the 
inspection; and (7) there was no infringement of free movement 
as the car was not stopped in transit. I<i. at 646-47. The 
court discussed the purposes of VINs, including aiding law 
enforcement personnel in tracing vehicles. The court then 
found that 
[t]here can therefore be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to the 
identity of the VIN* Opening the car 
door, looking under the hood, or crawling 
under the car to inspect the rear axle 
does not independently bring an inspection 
of the VIN within the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Polk, 433 F.2d at 644. The court further observed that a car 
is not like a home. Much of the interior and all of the 
exterior is in view of the public and not protected. -Although 
opening the [unlocked] door of the car may involve a technical 
trespass, such action does not invade any expectation of 
privacy.- I&. at 647-48. 
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The United States Supreme Court considered the legality of 
a warrantless search for a VIN in Hew York v. Class. 106 S. Ct. 
960 (1986).2 Police stopped a speeding car with a cracked 
windshield. The officer opened the car door to look for the 
VIN on the doorjamb, as he could not see the dashboard VIN 
through the cracked windshield. When the officer did not find 
the VIN on the doorjamb/ he moved papers aside on the dashboard 
which obscured the VIN. In this process he observed a gun in 
the car protruding from underneath the driver's seat. The 
state used the gun as evidence in convicting defendant of 
illegal possession of a weapon. Appeal was based on denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress. The Court discussed at length 
the purposes served by VINs and the federal statute requiring 
that all automobiles have a VIN in plain view of someone 
outside the car. 49 C.F.R. § 571.115 (1984). Justice 
O'Connor/ speaking for the majority/ observed that "the State's 
intrusion into a particular area, whether in an automobile or 
elsewhere/ cannot result in a Fourth Amendment violation unless 
the area is one in which there is a 'constitutionally protected 
reasonable expectation of privacy.'" Jji. at 965 (quoting Katz 
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347/ 360 (1967)). The Court found a 
lesser legitimate expectation of privacy in automobiles than 
other locations because of the physical characteristics of 
automobiles. Their function is transportation/ not as a 
repository of personal effects. Consequently/ the Court found 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN on the 
dashboard. Ici. at 965-66. Covering the VIN with papers could 
not change the result/ as an attempt to hide what was not 
subject to privacy would not render it private.3 The Court 
did say# however/ that the remainder of the car's interior was 
subject to fourth amendment protection/ and an intrusion 
therein would be a "search." I£. at 966. The Court held that 
the search for the VIN is not a "search" within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment because of the lack of reasonable 
expectation of privacy, but then explained that the subsequent 
seizure of the gun# which was in plain view, was justified by 
the safety factor. Id. at 967-68. 
The Court noted that VINs are, by law, either inside the 
door or on the dashboard. "Neither of those locations is 
2. The Court's main opinion was joined by a narrow majority. 
J. O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court joined by C.J. 
Burger, J. Blackmun, J. Powell and J. Rehnquist. J. Powell 
concurred/ joined by C.J. Burger. J. Brennan filed a dissent 
joined by J. Marshall and J. Stevens, and J. White dissented 
joined by J. Stevens. 
3. We note that the legitimate governmental purposes served by 
readily visible VINs would be defeated if persons were able to 
insulate them from inspection by obscuring them. 
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subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy. The officer 
here checked both those locations, and only those two locations 
. . . . He [the officer] did not even intrude into the 
interior at all until after he had checked the door jamb for 
the VIN*- Id. at 968. The Court clearly stated that VlNs, 
whether on the dashboard or the car door, may be inspected by 
police without a warrant, so long as the intrusion is for that 
limited purpose, because there is no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in a VIN.4 I£. at 968-69. 
In the case before us, the officers could have easily 
obtained a warrant for the search of the car. There was no 
indication that the car would not be available, as defendant 
had no idea that officers had been checking the car or 
investigating the possibility that it was a stolen vehicle. 
Indeed, he apparently had contentedly used the automobile as 
his own for years. No other factors existed which would have 
otherwise justified a warrantless search. However, we are 
bound by Class to conclude that the search was valid.5 The 
record indicates that the intrusion was minimal. Officers only 
opened the door and recorded the VIN, They did not search the 
interior of the car. The inspection was much less intrusive 
than that allowed in Class, which involved entry into the car. 
Although ordinarily the mere existence of probable cause would 
not justify a warrantless search, Class finds that the 
existence of probable cause coupled with a nonintrusive 
4, The Supreme Court in Class stated that the doorplate VIN as 
well as the dashboard VIN is -ordinarily in plain view of 
someone outside the automobile.- 106 S. Ct. at 968. This is of 
course true only if the door is sufficiently ajar to permit the 
doorplate to be viewed. It seems clear that the Supreme Court 
would find no distinction of constitutional significance in 
moving obstructions so a dashboard VIN could be seen and moving 
the car door so a doorplate VIN could be seen. Indeed, if 
anything, the latter is less intrusive as the plane defining the 
interior of the car is not crossed and the interior, therefore, 
not physically penetrated. Nor must the officer make an 
election as to which VIN source he will view. In Class, as 
here, the officer -checked both those locations, and only those 
locations.- Id at 968. 
5. It is perhaps true, as the dissent suggests, that the same 
result would be reached if the instant case were analyzed under 
the standards articulated in California v. Carnev, 105 S. Ct. 
2066 (1985). However, because this case is factually closer to 
Class and because Class is more narrowly drawn and thus presents 
a less drastic departure from previously decided fourth 
amendment cases, we are more comfortable premising our decision 
on Class. 
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examination of a VIN legalizes such examination.6 Therefore, 
we hold that the search was legal and that denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress was proper.' 
II. 
JUROR MISCONDUCT 
Defendant contends that mistrial should have been declared 
when it was discovered that a juror had a conversation with a 
witness during the trial. The record indicates that after jury 
selection and just prior to the commencement of trial, a juror 
and Mr. Hailes, a prosecution witness, had a brief, casual 
conversation. Mr. Hailes told the juror he planned to go to 
Eureka, Utah and hoped the trial would not last too long. He 
also said he was surprised that none of the jurors had indicated, 
when asked, that they felt police officers were more believable 
than other people. Mr. Hailes told the juror he probably would 
have responded affirmatively to that question. When questioned 
in chambers by the trial court judge about the conversation, the 
juror declared that the conversation had not produced any bias 
and that she could fairly assess the evidence without regard to 
the conversation. The judge denied defendant's motion for a 
mistrial. 
6. Justice Brennan's dissent in Class focuses on a perceived 
lack of probable cause to search for the VIN. The record here 
has no comparable lack. The officers knew-, prior to their 
second visit to the subject car, that the VIN on the state's 
registration records for the vehicle belonged to a 1973 Mustang 
registered in the name of Neil Hailes, not defendant. 
Additionally, the vehicle had distinctive markings identical to 
those of the stolen vehicle. 
7. The Utah Supreme Court has, to date, decided search and 
seizure cases argued under a Utah constitutional theory 
consonant with decisions under the United States Constitution's 
fourth amendment, eschewing a different standard. See State v. 
Hvoh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 
(Utah 1984). We agree with the dissent that any departure from 
this approach should be announced by our state's supreme court, 
not this Court. We further agree that it is in the context of 
vehicular searches, which the federal courts have treated with 
inconsistency, or worse, where consideration of some departure 
from the course set by the federal courts in interpreting the 
federal constitution would be most appropriate. We do not agree 
that adherence to federal doctrines in this case works a result 
so egregious as to make this case the one where plenary 
consideration is given to whether our state's constitution 
requires something more, or different, than the fourth amendment 
to the federal constitution. 
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The problem of juror/witness contact was examined in an 
early Utah case in which a prosecuting witness had driven a 
juror to and from the court throughout the two week trial. 
State v, Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, 942 (1925). 
Affidavits of both stated they had not discussed the trial and 
that the juror had not been influenced in any way. The Utah 
Supreme Court noted that the Utah Constitution, art. I, § 12, 
guarantees trial by an impartial jury. The witness in Anderson 
was one whose testimony was critical to the prosecution. The 
Court remanded for a new trial, stating that 
any conduct or relationship between a 
juror and a party to an action during 
trial that would or might, consciously or 
unconsciously, tend to influence the 
judgment of the juror authorizes and 
requires the granting of a new trial, 
unless it is made to appear affirmatively 
that the judgment of the juror was in no 
way affected by such relationship or that 
the parties by their conduct waived their 
right to make objection to such conduct. 
m at 943. 
In State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1977), three jurors 
had coffee in a sheriff's office on two occasions when officers 
who were witnesses in the case were present. Both the jurors 
and the officers testified that there had"been no conversation 
about anything pertaining to the case. The Utah Supreme Court 
stated that they strongly disapproved of the conduct, as even 
the appearance of misconduct should be avoided. The Court 
nevertheless held that "notwithstanding a showing of minor 
impropriety or irregularity there should be no reversal of a 
conviction unless it appears that a party has been prejudiced 
in that in the absence of such impropriety there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been 
different.- id. at 1109. The Court found that the trial court 
had thoroughly examined the incidents and determined that no 
prejudice against defendant resulted. That determination was 
given deference and affirmed by the Court. 
A different conclusion was reached in State v. Pike, 712 
P.2d 277 (Utah 1985). There the Court found that a mistrial 
should have been granted where a juror talked to a witjiess. 
The Pike Court explained that *[a]nything more than the most 
incidental contact during the trial between witnesses and 
jurors casts doubt upon the impartiality of the jury and at 
best gives the appearance of the absence of impartiality." ]&. 
at 279-80. The Court stated that Utah has adopted a stringent 
rule that -prejudice may well exist even though it is not 
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provable and even though a person who has been tainted may not, 
himself, be able to recognize that fact," I£. at 280. The 
Court stated that in Utah the rule is that any improper contact 
between a juror and a witness creates a rebuttable presumption 
of prejudice. This presumption arises after any contact "which 
goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact." 
XfiL. at 280. In applying the presumption, the Court found that, 
even though there was no conversation about the trial between 
the witness, who was the arresting officer, and the juror, the 
effect of the contact was "breeding a sense of familiarity" 
which could affect the credibility of that witness with that 
juror. The Court held the juror's denial of prejudice or 
influence was, therefore, insufficient to overcome the 
presumption, and the mistrial should have been granted. 
In the present case, the witness, Mr. Hailes, who talked to 
the juror, was admittedly a minor witness whose testimony was 
uncontroverted. He testified that he had owned a Ford Mustang 
with the same VIN as was on the dashboard of the subject 
Mustang, and that his Mustang had been destroyed in an 
accident. The critical issue, therefore, appears to be the 
content of the conversation, which involved the credibility of 
police officers as compared with others. Based on Pike, we 
must examine whether or not the state successfully rebutted the 
presumption of prejudice created by the contact. The state 
argues that the presumption was successfully rebutted for three 
reasons: (1) the juror stated she was not influenced by the 
contact; (2) Mr. Hailes was not a key witness nor in such a 
respected position that he would likely be influential; and 
most importantly, (3) the testimony presented at trial by 
police officers was uncontroverted, so that their credibility 
was not an issue.8 The trial judge listened to the testimony 
and arguments regarding possible prejudice. We find that he 
reasonably determined that the state had sustained its burden 
of demonstrating that no prejudice against defendant resulted 
from the contact. 
8. Police officers offered testimony and evidence to establish 
that the car was stolen. Defendant did not dispute that the car 
was stolen and the jury was not asked to decide that issue. 
Defendant denied he was the person who stole the car. The 
question to be decided by the jury, therefore, was whether or 
not defendant had stolen the car, which issue did not hinge on 
the credibility of the police officers* testimony. 
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III. 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES 
Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly 
allowed the jury to convict him of both theft of an operable 
motor vehicle and possession of a stolen vehicle because the 
possession charge is a lesser included offense of the theft 
charge. Theft of an operable motor vehicle is a second degree 
felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) and possession of 
a stolen vehicle is a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-1-112 (1982). Defendant contends that under § 76-1-402 
(1978) he should not have been convicted of both offenses. 
That section states: 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an 
offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the 
offense charged and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) it is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission 
of the offense charged; 
Defendant was charged with theft which occurred in 1981, 
and possession of a stolen vehicle occurring in 1985. A 
"single criminal episode" is defined as "all conduct which is 
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-401 (1978). Because of the remoteness in time of the 
two offenses, section 76-1-402 (3) cannot bar the multiple 
convictions, as that section is limited to and defined by 
"separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode." 
Defendant also argues that the offenses should have been 
alternative pursuant to the reasoning advanced in State v. 
Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983). In Hill, the Utah Supreme Court 
considered whether or not defendant should have been convicted 
of both aggravated robbery and theft. The court stated that 
"the greater-lesser relationship must be determined by 
comparing the statutory elements of the two crimes as a 
theoretical matter and, where necessary, by reference to the 
facts proved at trial." I£. at 97. If it appears that the 
greater crime could not have been committed without necessarily 
committing the lesser there can be only one conviction". 
If the facts were that the possession charge arose from 
possession of stolen goods immediately after or close in time 
to the theft of those same goods, we might be persuaded by 
defendant's arguments and the applicability of Hill. However, 
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where the events occurred four years apart and where there were 
intervening circumstances and perhaps intervening possessors of 
the stolen goods, the argument fails. The crime of theft by no 
means includes retention and possession of the stolen goods for a 
period in excess of four years. Therefore, we find,that it was 
proper to allow the jury to convict defendant on both charges. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
ORME, Judge: (Concurring) 
I concur fully in the main opinion. I write separately to 
expand upon why, in my judgment, the juror-witness contact in this 
case does not require reversal. J-
As I read State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985), two 
preliminary and two more substantive inquiries are relevant in 
considering whether the presumption of prejudice has been rebutted. 
Preliminarily, the questioning of the juror and/or witness must be 
exhaustive and "disclose the entire contents of the conversation." 
Id. at 280. In addition, a complete transcript must be made and 
provided on appeal. Id.. These preliminary requirements were both 
met in this case. The trial court's examination was thorough and 
penetrating, eventually eliciting, as the dissent points out, 
disclosure of the comments about police officer credibility. 
Moreover, both the prosecutor and defense counsel asked further 
questions of the juror. The complete examination was transcribed and 
is part of the record before us. 
The more substantive inquiries are 1) whether the witness is 
Man important prosecution witness,- and 2) -the scope and subject 
matter of the conversation.- See id. Moreover, there is interplay 
between these two inquiries: The more important the witness, the 
less relevant the subjects discussed by the witness and juror. Thus, 
in Pike, the subject discussed, namely a backyard slip-and-fall 
sustained off-duty, was itself quite harmless. Nonetheless, because 
of the importance of the witness, as -both the arresting officer and 
a witness at the scene of the altercation,- ill., Pike's conviction 
1. In so stating, I acknowledge the question is a close one. 
I also note my agreement with the dissent that the preferred 
course in this case would have been to excuse the juror and 
seat one of the available alternates. In this area, trial 
courts should err on the side of caution to avoid even the 
least doubt about the jury's impartiality. All such problems 
are avoided, as the dissent observes, if jurors are rigorously 
segregated from witnesses. 
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was reversed. Although the backyard slip-and-fall was 
unrelated to the proceedings, the discussion "had the effect of 
breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the 
juror's judgment as to credibility." !£. at 281. 
In the instant case, the witness Hailes was quite 
unimportant. As explained in the main opinion, his limited 
testimony was confined to mundane and undisputed matters. 
Accordingly, his credibility was wholly inconsequential. 
Whether a juror had "a sense of familiarity" with Hailes or 
considered him a very scoundrel, he was not a pivotal witness 
and the verdict would clearly be the same, regardless of his 
preceived credibility. Stated another way, his testimony was 
inherently credible and was not challenged or controverted by 
defendant, making Hailes a minor, rather than an important, 
witness. 
Even where, as here, the witness is so unimportant that 
the impact of increased familiarity on his credibility is 
inconsequential, attention must be given to the "scope and 
subject matter of the conversation" between juror and witness. 
Id. at 280. Of key concern in this case is Mr. Hailes' remark 
about the believability of police officers. While it is likely 
the unsolicited comment was dismissed out of hand by the juror, 
consistent with the strict approach of Pike we need to assume, 
for purposes of analysis, that the comment prompted reflection 
by the juror on the veracity of police officers and the 
conclusion that perhaps police officers were, after all, more 
believable than witnesses generally. As the dissenting opinion 
observes, "police officers are generally the most important 
witnesses for the prosecution," and in the typical criminal 
case an observation such as the one made by Hailes, however 
gratuitous and innocently intended, would render the 
presumption of prejudice all but impossible to rebut. 
Here, however, the officers were no more important as 
witnesses than Hailes. Unlike the officer in Pike, who not 
only effected Pike's arrest, but also was a key witness to the 
events which led to his discharging a shotgun at a car driven 
by rowdies, the police witnesses in this case, as explained in 
note 8 to the main opinion, testified to matters not in 
dispute. Their testimony, if believed, established that the 
car found at defendant's home was stolen. However, whether or 
to what extent they were believed was of no moment, since 
defendant conceded the car was stolen, albeit not by him. 
Testimony tying defendant to the original theft was offered 
exclusively by witness Luce, and it was the credibility of 
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Luce, not the police officers, which mattered.2 This is best 
emphasized by defendant's closing argument, which was devoted 
to a lengthy discussion of perceived problems with Luce's 
identification of defendant as the person who drove off with 
the Mustang, while omitting any reference to the police 
officers' testimony. 
As I see it, the state has demonstrated that Hailes was 
not an important witness and that, in the peculiar context of 
this case, the subjects discussed by the juror^ and witness 
were inconsequential. These factors, when coupled with the 
juror's unqualified expression that she had not been influenced 
by the conversation with Hailes, serve to rebut the presumption 
of prejudice which arises under Pike. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
BILLINGS, Judge: (Concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
I agree with Part III of the majority opinion and the 
decision reached by the majority that defendant had standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the search of the Mustang 
and therefore join in Part 1A of the court's opinion. Although 
I concur in the result reached by the majority that there was 
no unconstitutional search, I disagree with important parts of 
the analysis. I further respectfully dissent from Part II of 
the majority opinion where my colleagues find that a juror's 
conversation with a prosecution witness on the merits of the 
proceeding was not grounds for a mistrial. I believe the juror 
misconduct denied the defendant a fair trial and would 
therefore reverse. 
JUROR MISCONDUCT 
I am persuaded that the trial judge should have 
substituted an alternative juror or declared a mistrial as a 
result of a prosecution witness' substantial conversation with 
2. By contrast, had Hailes commented about the high degree of 
believability of used car salesmen, I would go the other way. 
Mr. Luce was an important witness and his credibility, memory, 
and identification were material. 
3. I do not share the dissent's concern about possible taint 
of a second juror. It is clear from the record that the second 
juror walked away as Mr. Hailes sat down to "share an ashtray" 
with the one juror with whom he then struck up conversation. 
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a juror on the merits of the case. I agree with the majority 
that our analysis of whether this unauthorized contact denied 
the defendant a fair trial is controlled by the recent Utah 
Supreme Court case of State v. Pike. 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 
1985). However, we read Pike differently. In Pikal the 
defendant's conviction was reversed when a prosecution witness, 
in response to a juror's question as to why he was limping, 
simply stated: "I told him I had bunged my toe and he asked me 
how I did that and I told him about slipping in my backyard on 
the water and breaking [it]." III. at 279. In finding that 
this encounter prejudiced the defendant's right to a trial by 
an impartial jury and required reversal, the supreme court 
stated: 
We have long taken a strict approach in 
assuring that the constitutional guarantee of 
a fair trial not be compromised by improper 
contacts between jurors and witnesses, 
attorneys, or court personnel. 
Anything more then the most incidental contact 
during the trial between witnesses and jurors 
casts doubt upon the impartiality of the jury 
and at best gives the appearance of the 
absence of impartiality. 
[P]rejudice may well exist even though it is 
not provable and even though a person who has 
been tainted may not, himself, be able to 
recognize that fact. 
The rule in this jurisdiction is that improper 
juror contact with witnesses or parties raises 
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. 
Id. at 279-80 (citations omitted). 
The court gives two reasons for this strict standard. 
First, it is extremely difficult for an appellant to prove how 
and to what degree a juror has in fact been influenced by a 
contact with a witness. Such influence may subconsciously 
affect the juror's judgment as to credibility and therefore the 
mere statement from the juror that the contact did not affect 
his decision does not suffice to rebut the presumption of 
prejudice. Second, the judicial process suffers from the 
appearance of impropriety resulting from a juror's conversation 
with a witness. Participants and observers are left to wonder 
860172-CA 16 
whether the defendant really received a fair trial. For these 
reasons, the court concludes that prejudice must be presumed 
whenever a contact goes beyond a mere incidental/ unintended 
and brief encounter. l£l. at 280. 
The court's strong language in Pike requires close 
scrutiny and clear assurance that the presumption of prejudice 
is overcome if the contact is substantial: "Indeed/ even if 
the jurors had denied that they were influenced by the 
encounter in the post trial hearing/ it is not enough to rebut 
the presumption of prejudice." !£. at 281. 
Pike further instructs that the presumption of prejudice 
attaches regardless of what was actually said between the juror 
and the witness. See id. at 279. The conversation in Pike was 
brief and did not involve the merits of the case and yet the 
court found that the presumption of prejudice required reversal. 
The facts before this court are more egregious than 
those in Pike. In this case the exchange was lengthier/ 
involved a prosecution witness/ and went to the merits of the 
proceedings. When questioned by the trial court the juror 
described his conversation with Mr. HaileS/ the prosecution 
witness: 
Well/ first of all/ he pulled the light switch 
in the hall and mentioned that it worked/ and 
then he did the other switch. And then he was 
saying he hoped it didn't — the case didn't 
go long, that he was going to Eureka/ just 
driving down there/ where I lived. 
Later/ the juror also recalls that Mr. Hailes asked her if she 
had served on a jury before. Like the conversation in Pike 
this encounter "no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of 
familiarity that could clearly affect the juror's judgment as 
to credibility". I£. at 281. 
The trial judge's questioning of the juror supports the 
supreme court's concern in Pike that jurors might not know when 
they have been prejudiced and would be hesitant to admit the 
taint. When first asked whether there was any conversation 
about the case the juror states "no nothing." Further along in 
the examination/ the juror continues to insist "the case wasn't 
mentioned at all." Finally/ just as the exchange with the 
judge is about to terminate/ the juror volunteers: 
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He did mention one thing. That he was 
surprised at the questions that were asked. 
And that he was surprised because he, himself, 
would have said yes when you (judge) asked if 
we would believe a policeman more than any 
other person. That was the only comment that 
was made . . . . When the judge asked if we 
would believe a policemen more than any other 
person, and he said he probably would have 
raised his hand. 
The majority agrees that the above-described encounter 
was more than a "brief incidental contact- which would raise 
the presumption of prejudice. 
The majority, in a conclusory statement, finds that 
*[t]he trial judge listened to the testimony and arguments 
regarding possible prejudice. We find that he reasonably 
determined that the state had sustained its burden of 
demonstrating that no prejudice against defendant resulted from 
the contact•" Perhaps the majority adopts the state's 
arguments that (1) the juror stated she was not influenced by 
the contact; (2) Mr. Hailes was not a key witness; and (3) the 
testimony presented at trial by the police officers was 
uncontroverted and therefore their credibility was not an 
issue. I believe each argument fails. 
First, under Pike a mere denial of prejudice by the 
juror is insufficient to rebut the presumption, particularly 
when, as here, the juror has difficulty admitting the extent of 
her conversation. 
Second, Mr. Hailes was not a minor, unimportant 
witness. Mr. Hailes* testimony was an essential part of the 
circumstantial web of evidence which persuaded the jury that 
the defendant stole the Mustang. He testified that the VIN 
glued to the defendant's dashboard and seized by the police 
came from a Mustang which belonged to him and which he had 
demolished on Christmas Eve 1975. Mr. Hailes6 testimony 
established the sequence of when and how the VIN was available 
to the defendant* The testimony supported the state's theory 
that the defendant removed the VIN from the wrecked Mustang to 
cover up his possession of the stolen Mustang. 
Third, and most crucial in my decision that the^ 
presumption of prejudice was not rebutted in this case," is the 
subject matter of the juror-witness exchange. Mr. Hailes' 
comment on the credibility of the two police officers who 
testified at trial goes to the core of this criminal case. The 
majority infers that because no one directly controverted the 
officers' testimony they were not important witnesses and 
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therefore their credibility was not at issue. I cannot agree. 
These two police officers initiated the investigation of the 
defendant/ gathered the evidence which was presented to 
ultimately convict the defendant, and testified about their 
efforts for the prosecution at trial. It is only common sense, 
and I believe all jurors understand, that police witnesses are 
testifying for the state and against the criminal defendant. 
In fact police officers are generally the most important 
witnesses for the prosecution. I believe the comment on the 
credibility of police witnesses went to the heart of this 
circumstantial case against the defendant. 
Furthermore, the record is unclear whether there was 
another juror who overheard Mr. Hailes* comments. This other 
juror was not called and questioned by the trial judge. Again, 
as in Pike, we do not have a complete picture of the contacts 
below. 
Pike inferentially directs trial judges to segregate 
jurors from witnesses, parties, and attorneys. In fact the 
trial judge in this proceeding after this initial problem 
states that he will isolate his jurors. Furthermore, this 
incident occurred and was called to the attention of the court 
before the trial began. The court, with little difficulty, 
could have replaced both tainted jurors with alternates. 
In conclusion, I find that the encounter between Mr. 
Hailes and the questioned juror created a presumption of 
prejudice. Because the contact went to the substance of the 
proceedings, and the record does not persuade me the 
presumption of prejudice was rebutted, I would reverse for a 
new trial by an impartial jury. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEARCH 
The defendant challenges the constitutionality of the 
search of the Mustang and the consequent discovery of the 
incriminating VIN under both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. 
The majority finds that the defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the VIN discovered after opening his 
car door, and then concludes there was no search within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment. I disagree with the 
majority's reading of New York v. Class, 106 S.Ct. 960 (1986) 
(5-4 decision), which they conclude compels this conclusion. 
A brief repetition of the facts relevant to the search 
in this case is important to demonstrate that Class does not 
require the majority's holding. In 1973, a new Ford Mustang 
was taken from a dealer for a test drive and never returned. 
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Four years later, the salesman involved recognized the 
defendant and believed he was the man who had stolen the 
Mustang from the salesman's previous employer, Mr. Padilla. 
The salesman relayed the information to Mr. Padilla who located 
the defendant's place of residence. 
Mr. Padilla found a 1973 Ford Mustang parked near the 
defendant's residence matching the unique characteristics of 
the stolen vehicle including: distinctive arm rests, tie downs 
on the hood, a black racing stripe on the hood and sides of the 
car, and a scoop on the front of the car. Mr. Padilla wrote 
down the license number of the car and notified the police. In 
response, Detective Robison went to defendant's neighborhood 
and saw the 1973 Mustang with the same license number and the 
aforementioned unique characteristics parked on the street. 
Robison continued her investigation by running the plate number 
and receiving the registered VIN. Six days later Detective 
Robison, accompanied by others, returned to the defendant's 
neighborhood and again found the unique Mustang parked on the 
street. It is undisputed that defendant had no knowledge that 
he or his car was under investigation. 
The officers peered through the windshield and read the 
VIN mounted on the dashboard. There was no visible evidence of 
tampering or anything suspicious about the placement or 
condition of the dashboard VIN. The VIN did not match the 
vehicle stolen from Mr. Padilla's lot. Nevertheless, the 
officers opened the car door and observed the VIN on the inside 
edge of the door. This VIN matched that af the stolen 
Mustang. The officers then arrested the defendant. 
Class does not compel the majority's conclusion that the 
defendant under the circumstances of this case had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the second VIN located 
inside his car. In Class, two police officers observed the 
defendant driving in excess of the speed limit with a cracked 
windshield in violation of New York law. Class was pulled over 
by the police. After the stop, and after Class' exit from the 
vehicle, and because the officers could not read the dashboard 
VIN from the outside because of a cracked windshield and 
covering papers, one officer reached into Class' vehicle to 
remove papers on the dashboard in order to read the dashboard 
VIN. While moving the papers, the officer observed a gun 
protruding from under the driver's seat. 
Class does not clearly articulate when one has A 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a VIN located inside his 
automobile because the focus of the alleged unconstitutional 
search in Class is the gun. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court in Class persuades me that defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN located inside his 
car after the officers had read the VIN on his dashboard from 
outside the car and found nothing out of the ordinary which 
would justify a further search. 
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Justice O'Connor carefully limits her holding in Class in 
order to write for a splintered Court: 
[W]e must decide whether, in order to observe a 
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) generally visible 
from outside an automobile, a police officer may reach 
into the passenger compartment of a vehicle to move 
papers obscuring the VIN after its driver has been 
stopped for a traffic violation and has exited the 
car. We hold that, in these circumstances, the police 
officer's action does not violate the Fourth Amendment* 
Id. at 962-63 (emphasis added). 
The Court emphasizes that under 49 C.F.R. § 571.115 (1984) 
a VIN must be located on the dashboard visible from the 
exterior of the vehicle and thus concludes that it is 
unreasonable to have an expectation of privacy in an object 
required by law to be located in a place ordinarily in plain 
view from the exterior of the automobile. Xd. at 966. 
Although the Supreme Court uses the term VIN loosely, I do 
not believe the Court intended that an officer may open the 
door to a vehicle after he has already read and recorded a VIN 
visible from the exterior of the car without triggering fourth 
amendment protections. As the Court states: "a car's interior 
as a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment 
protection from unreasonable intrusions from the police. We 
agree that the intrusion into that space constituted a 
•search.'- I&. at 966. The Court continues: 
We note that our holding today does not authorize 
police officers to enter a vehicle to obtain a 
dashboard-mounted VIN when the VIN is visible from 
outside the automobile. If the VIN is in the plain 
view of someone outside the vehicle, there is no 
justification for governmental intrusion into the 
passenger compartment to see it. 
111. at 969 (emphasis added). 
The police, in opening the door to the 1973 Ford Mustang, 
conducted a search subject to fourth amendment protection 
because the VIN on the dashboard was clearly visible and did 
not appear abnormal upon inspection. This is not an 
unimportant technicality in analysis. Under the majority's 
view, police may at random and without probable cause search 
cars under the pretext of finding another VIN as there would be 
no search subject to fourth amendment protection. 
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If, as the majority infers, the fourth amendment still 
prohibited all warrantless searches of vehicles except upon a 
finding of (1) probable cause for the search; and (2) exigent 
circumstances, I would find the opening of the Mustang's door 
and the discovery of the incriminating VIN an unconstitutional 
search. However, I believe that under California v. Carney, 
105 SoCt. 2066 (1985), and its progeny, the "automobile 
exception" to the search warrant requirement of the fourth 
amendment has been expanded to encompass this case. Under 
Carnev, anything on wheels can be subjected to a search without 
a search warrant, provided the officers have probable cause for 
the search. Exigent circumstances are now presumed because of 
the vechicle's potential mobility. 
In Carney, the majority concluded: 
In short, the pervasive schemes of 
regulation, which necessarily lead to 
reduced expectations of privacy, and the 
exigencies attendant to ready mobility 
justify searches without prior recourse to 
the authority of a magistrate so long as 
the overriding standard of probable cause 
is met. 
I£. at 2070.1 
In the instant case, the police officers had probable cause 
to suspect that the Mustang searched was stolen. Detective 
Robison received a call from the owner of the Mustang who 
explained that a former salesman had identified the defendant 
as the person who had failed to return a car after an 
1. Cases subsequent to Carney have interpreted the Supreme 
Court's decision broadly. Most imply that the -automobile 
exception- to the fourth amendment allows for warrantless 
searches of automobiles if the search is reasonable in scope 
and supported by probable cause. There is no longer a need to 
demonstrate exigent circumstances as they are presumed from the 
wheels on the vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Grandstaff, 
807 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Hamilton, 
792 F.2d 837, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Hepperle, 810 F.2d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 1987) (rejected 
appellant's argument that no exigent circumstances existed 
because the automobile was in disrepair and was incapable of 
being moved finding that probable cause is all that is 
necessary to justify a warrantless search); State v. Badaett, 
200 Conn. 412, 512 A.2d 160, 169 (1986); State v. Cain, 400 
N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 1987); State v. Akers, 723 S.W.2d 9, 13 
(Mo. App. 1986). 
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unaccompanied test drive. Mr. Padilla, the owner, located the 
unique Mustang near the defendant's home. Detective Robison 
confirmed that the Mustang was registered in the defendant's 
name. About a week later, the officers returned to the 
neighborhood where the Mustang was parked. It matched the 
owner's description of the stolen car. It had distinctive arm 
rests, tie downs on the hood, a black racing stripe on the hood 
and sides of the car, and a scoop on the front of the car. 
Although the majority agrees there was no reason why the 
officers should not have gotten a search warrant and no 
traditional exigent circumstances, this is no longer fatal to 
the search. Under the standard established by the United 
States Supreme Court in Carney, the search was reasonable under 
the fourth amendment as there was probable cause to believe the 
car was stolen. 
To date the Utah Supreme Court/ in applying article I, § 
14 of the Utah Constitution to warrantless vehicle searches, 
has followed the interpretation previously given to the fourth 
amendment by the United States Supreme Court. See State v. 
Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). I must/ therefore, 
reluctantly concur in the decision of the majority that the 
search was not unconstitutional. However/ I do not believe 
that Utah must continue to accept the United States Supreme 
Court's constantly changing interpretation of federal search 
and seizure law in interpreting its own constitution. This 
change in direction, however, must come from the supreme court 
of this state. 
Because I suggest a re-examination of Utah law in light of 
Carnev, a brief history of the "automobile exception" to the 
search warrant requirement of the fourth amendment is 
appropriate. Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution and the 
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution use 
identical language to protect their citizens against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Historically, these 
constitutional mandates have meant that "searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge 
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions." Coolidae v. New Hampshire, 403 
U.S. 443, 454-55, (1971) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357, (1967)). See State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 
408, 411 <Utah 1984). 
The "automobile exception" to the search warrant 
requirement of the fourth amendment was first articulated by 
the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, (1925). In Carroll, the Court concluded that 
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant/ because the 
vehicle will be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction (exigent 
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circumstances), and when the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the vehicle is involved in criminal activity, no 
search warrant is required. I&. at 151-52. 
In Coolidae, the Court, while ultimately concluding that 
the -automobile exception" was irrelevant to the facts, 
implicitly reaffirmed the two-prong test of exigent 
circumstances plus probable cause: 
The word "automobile" is not a talisman in whose 
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and 
disappears. And surely there is nothing in this case 
to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule of 
Carroll v. United States — no alerted criminal bent 
on flight/ no fleeting opportunity on an open highway 
after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods 
or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the 
evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special 
police detail to guard the immobilized automobile. In 
short, by no possible stretch of the imagination can 
this be made into a case where "it is not practicable 
to secure a warrant . . . ." 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 461-62 (citations omitted).2 
As discussed previously, California v. Carney dramatically 
expanded the circumstances where warrantless searches of motor 
vehicles will be allowed by eliminating the requirement of 
exigent circumstances. Because of the recent, radical 
restriction of the fourth amendment's protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures of automobiles in Carney, it 
may well be time for the Utah Supreme Court to reconsider its 
position. 
Following the previous federal standard, Utah law has 
required a finding of both probable cause and traditional 
exigent circumstances to justify the search of a vehicle 
without a warrant. State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 
(Utah 1984) (Justice Stewart writing for the court determined 
2. Justice White in his dissent in Coolidge argued that the 
confusing morass of legal technicalities surrounding 
warrantless searches of automobiles should be eliminated. He 
proposed the adoption of a simple rule — a search of § movable 
vehicle without a warrant would be per se reasonable so long as 
the police had probable cause for the search. Coolidge, 403 
U.S. at 527 (White, J., dissenting). 
Justice White's views were essentially adopted by the 
Supreme Court in the recent case of California v. Carney, 105 
S. Ct. 2066 (1985). 
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that "[warrantless searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable unless exigent circumstances require action before 
a warrant can be obtained. . . . [T]he police must have 
probable cause to believe that the automobile contains either 
contraband or evidence of a crime and that they may be lost if 
not immediately seized.") (emphasis added); State v. Limb, 581 
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) ("Only in exigent circumstances will 
the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a 
sufficient authorization for a search.-); accord State v. Cole 
674 P.2d 119, 123 (Utah 1983); State v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 
405, 503 P.2d 848, 849-50 (1972). 
The Oregon Supreme Court has observed that w[w]hen this 
court gives Oregon law an interpretation corresponding to a 
federal opinion, our decision remains the Oregon law even when 
federal doctrine later changes." State v. Caraher. 293 Or. 
741, 653 P.2d 942, 946 (1982). By the same token, the State of 
Utah need not change its search and seizure law merely because 
the United States Supreme Court has seen fit to change the 
corresponding federal law. 
In interpreting its own constitution, a state is not 
bound by the interpretation given by the United States Supreme 
Court to similar language in the federal constitution. See, 
e.g., Oreoon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); State v. 
Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981). The Utah Supreme Court 
has clearly accepted this principle: 
Although Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution 
incorporates the same general fundamental principles as 
are incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause, our 
construction and application of Article I, § 24 are not 
controlled by the federal courts' construction and 
application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case law 
developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may be 
persuasive in applying Article I, § 24, but that law is 
not binding so long as we do not reach a result that 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984) (citations 
omitted). 
State courts responding to the confusing and restrictive 
new federal interpretations are relying on an analysis of their 
own search and seizure provisions to expand constitutional 
protection beyond those mandated by the fourth amendment, often 
directly avoiding applicable United States Supreme Court 
precedent. See, e.g., State v. Caraher, 293 Or. 741, 653 P.2d 
942, 947 (1982); State v. Glass. 583 P.2d 872, 876 (Alaska 
1978); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 (Haw. 1974); People v. 
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Beavers. 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511, 516 (1975), cert, 
denied 423 U.S. 878 (1975); O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 
400, 405 (Minn. 1979); State v. Brackman. 178 Mont. 105, 582 
P.2d 1216, 1220 (1978); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 
952 (1982); State v. Kock, 302 Or. 29, 725 P.2d 1285, 1287 
(1986); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899 (R.I. 1980); State 
v. Ooperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976). 
Justice Zimmerman recently criticized the federal approach 
to warrantless searches: "The federal law regarding 
warrantless searches and seizures has become a labyrinth of 
rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing 
rationalizations and distinctions." Hygh, 711 P.2d at 271-72 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring); see also State v. Johnson, 60 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 30, 33 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J. concurring). 
While it is true that the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Carney has simplified the federal approach to the 
automobile exception under the fourth amendment, it has done so 
at the sacrifice of the rights of the citizens of this nation 
to be secure in their effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The warning of Justice Jackson should be heeded: 
[Fourth amendment rights] . . . are not mere 
second-class rights but belong in the catalog 
of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations 
of rights, none is so effective in cowering a 
population, crushing the spirit of the 
individual and putting terror in every heart. 
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the 
first and most effective weapons in the 
arsenal of every arbitrary government. 
Brineoar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting). 
Following many of her sister state courts, the Utah Supreme 
Court may take this opportunity to simplify Utah's vehicle 
search and seizure law without gutting the protection it 
provides to the citizens of this state. See State v. Earl, 716 
P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1986). Warrantless vehicle searches could 
be restricted to only those situations where they serve their 
original purpose of protecting police officers and preventing 
the immediate destruction of evidence. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264, 272 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
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APPENDIX B 
UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Phillip Paul Laracco, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
&<30udp 
No. 860172-CA 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings and Orme. 
Pursant to the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 3(a), 
appellant's petition for rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 6th day of October, 1987. 
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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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uT'Jm\» *M". TADOCCO, ) Criminal No. CR 85-742 
Judge David B. Dee 
Deferent. ) 
Th^ cuate of Utah, by and through Creighcon C. 
M^vHr>n, T i , art* tip n^fpndant, oy and through his counsel 
T - s s i ^r. «•-i i
 f her^hy stipulate to the following facts for pur-
p..-5,?c -u the npfon^ant's Motion to Suppress: 
In Jun* of 19R1, a 1973 Ford Mustang (Vin *3F05HI64. 
A(,p) .^..M>rtd hy William Padilla was stolen from his car lot, Stace 
Aut^ ci'«s, 41*7 ?o. State Street, by a nan who took the rar 
*->r a * -=«t ^ rivp ?nH nr**'i?r returned it. The salesman assist-13 
t-..r> rap w=\s o*-« [uc^. Luce nad seer, the man several ti^es 
r-*ior to t^o tp.-»- (H-i^e and later cescrioed him to the police as 
vr-s^ n*- ' pg "^n o^loui^e, the actor. Wnen the man failed to 
c/-:-.s-
stipulation of F?.cts 
Case CP S5-7/12 
Page 2 
return tht* vehicle cr pay -for it, Mr. Padilla reported the 
theft tn th^ police. 
Nearly four years later, in May of 1985, Dave Luce, 
r:w a salesman pnr Valley Ford, recognized the Defendant, who 
h.**ri c.>"v* into test drive another Ford Mustang, as the same 
men who had absconded with Padilla !s car in 1981. Luce 
obtained information from a fellow.salesman, Patrick Sullivan, 
w*o was essistlrg the Defendant. Defendant had given his 
name as Phillir Wilson and his address as 7442 Gardenia Ave. 
At th.^ t time n^fendant appeared to be on foot, hut 2 or 2 
r*tv'?s |?r?L* LJCP noticed the Defendant driving a Mustang which 
app^ate-* to Hi*- tc be the same vehicle stolen from Padilla's 
1c1" in la81. Luce called Padilla and conveyed to him the 
•^~o*-~ i'-f -?rm?t i on, which Padilla later passed on to Linda 
r.-v^^n
 0f the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. 
After receiving the call from Luce, Padilla went to 
the vicinity of 74^2 Gardenia Ave, and although there was no 
such andress, he located his vehicle parked in front of the 
residence *t 7242 Gardenia Ave. He recognized the car not 
o^ly pror its genera] appearance, out from a repaired interior 
rVv^ - f.'?-o] w^ich hi? shop had worked .on back in 1981 prior co 
offo»*l-ia the c^r For sale. Padilla called the police. He 
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did not see or sp^ak to the Defendant. 
After receiving the call, Detective Robison went to 
the vicinity and located the vehicle parked in front of 
ne?enr'ant,e* re«idencp at 7242 Gardenia Ave. She noted t*e 
license number cf the car, its description, and the address, 
a
.nd left without farther approaching the vehicle or the 
r^idence at that tire. She conducted, further invest i r; a L ~o:i 
by running the pl?f; number and receiving back an associated 
VIM number { 3F05P10J <*6fl) . *A VIN searcn through the Department 
o? Motor Vehicles rpvaaled that the car which was originally 
rogi^t^cd unrJ*r such number, a -1973 Mach One Ford Mustang, 
v-is purchased pew in 1973 by Neal Hailes of Salt Lake City. 
Ti r'^ s \ egist^red tn Hailes through 1975. The next registra-
tion entry for -uch VIN1 number was to tne Defendant in 19^1. 
Approximately one week after first seeing the 
"ehicle, Detective Robison returned to Defendant's address 
apri 55 =2w the vehicle parked in front of his residence. Kip 
Inger-o^l From tne Division of Motor Vehicles also responded 
to the scene. The police looked through the windshield and 
S?V/ => <?IN number, 3F05H101968, which did not match the VIN of 
the w?hi-ie v:hich had been stolen from Padilla in 1981. The 
oolicp oopner* the unlocked driver's door and checked the 
5h*rulnti^n o* pa«:t^ 
C**<* CP 85-712 
Page 4 
safecy st^ rvi^ vd sticker located thereon. There they locatec 
the reportedly stolen car's VIN, 3F05H164088. At the tine 
tney opened th« door to check the identification sticker, 
th^y rUd no^ hare a warrant, nor had they contacted the 
Defendant or anyone at his residence to notify hirn of the 
car'? infection nv that he was a suspect in an auto theft. 
After Finding the VIN number of the stolen car 
inci^o
 h^9 door r>^n°l, the police contacted Defendant at his 
L-ac-Mence. "3 acknowledged, after Miranda, his possession of 
t-hp -phif i<*. telling them that he owned it, having purchase 
i** fio~ '^-re^ tor C^^ro] et in the summer of 1981. He sub-
seuue^ti ' nroHuc^d a title to trie venicle, hearing the date 
0£ ?-;p_q? ?n- i vi^ number of 3F05H10I968. The police 
arrfc5w.e'4 > ^  ^"/-"n^ant ^n tne mstanc charges. 
A*ter irpouncMig the vehicle, Kip Ingersoll of tne 
Di^ i'-i^ n *"»F Motor Vehicles also located another VIN numoer on 
tw° car''2 e^ ar-e conpirking ic to be Padilla's vehicle (3F05Hlou. 
08 q). -puM-e,=>ftPr they checked the VIN tag on the dashboard 
(3Tn^uj ii] nr;«» and found that it had been glued on rather than 
ri^ r'fo'4, Sjhseg.jent investigation revealed that the vehicle* 
rri;::^1,v reai-tered to Neal Hailes with that VIN number had 
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bee^ total !<*ri in a car wreck in December of 1975, 
Pv^srectfully submitted this fa-* day of Aagas 
CR2IGHT0N C. HORTON, II 
Deputy County Attorney 
< 
'•'MA ft .&wvd 
LISA REMAU 
A t t o r n e y f o r De fendant 
